MAHARAJA HARI SINGH: ACCESSION DELAYED - A VIEWPOINT

The question of the delayed accession by Maharaja Hari Singh in 1947 has been a subject of much speculation. Why was the accession not signed before August 15, 1947? What could have been the implications and its impact on the history and relationship between the two dominions, namely Jammu and Kashmir State and India? Many scholars and writers have shed light on this subject. I will provide my views based on my personal interactions with Maharaja Hari Singh, as well as my understanding of his personality and disposition.

First, let me begin with Maharaja Hari Singh’s personality. He was known to be an upright, honest, and no-nonsense person. As the ruler of a strategically located, complex, and challenging state, he faced numerous difficulties, including diverse terrain, climate, religions, languages, cultures, and ethnicities. He governed a state that was, to a large extent, a model of unity in diversity, long before the concept was enshrined in India’s constitution. While India is still learning to govern a country with such diversity, the Dogras, from Maharaja Gulab Singh to Maharaja Hari Singh, had successfully achieved this unity amidst challenges and maintained communal harmony until 1947. If something went wrong in 1947, it was primarily due to the mischief of the British, who divided the country on religious grounds with their policy of “Divide and Rule” for many years. When their initial plan failed, they divided the country again, so as not to pose a threat to the British Empire. Perhaps they believed that this newly divided nation would not survive without their help, and they could continue to exploit their resources. This is why the British created Pakistan, with the promise to give Kashmir to Pakistan. When they realized that Maharaja Hari Singh might not join Pakistan, Lord Mountbatten, the Viceroy, personally came to Kashmir to advise Maharaja Hari Singh to accede to Pakistan, with a veiled threat that if he did not, he would have no support or protection from anyone. Maharaja Hari Singh had been forewarned of this move and avoided meeting Mountbatten formally, as meeting him would have implied that Jammu and Kashmir State was going to Pakistan, which he was not prepared for. 

Cornered in this situation, Maharaja Hari Singh decided to have Standstill Agreements with both the newly formed dominions of India and Pakistan immediately after independence. While India rejected his request, Pakistan accepted it but continued to pressure him to accede to Pakistan by cutting off support systems to the state. At that time, there were no roads, railways, or telecommunication links between India and Jammu and Kashmir, and all communications relied on Pakistan. It is important to note that Mountbatten’s veiled threat implied that Pakistan could attack the state. In fact, the British had already planned this contingency and issued an operation order for the capture of the valley. This plan was executed on October 21, 1947, when Pakistan, disguising its forces as tribesmen, invaded the valley. It is a mystery and part of history that a force of 6,000 invaders, led and organized by Pakistani officers, JCOs, and NCOs, attacked the 4th Jammu and Kashmir Infantry Battalion in Muzaffarabad on the night of October 21-22, 1947, without Mountbatten’s knowledge, who was still the Supreme Commander of both the armies. It is still unclear why Mountbatten, as the Supreme Commander, did not have information about such a large-scale invasion. Only due to the heroic stand of Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Army, the British plan did not fully succeed. Brigadier Rajinder Singh fought for four days after destroying the Uri Bridge, preventing the invaders from reaching Baramulla. It was only after Brigadier Rajinder Singh was killed in an ambush at Buniyar in the early hours of October 27, 1947, that the invaders managed to reach Baramulla and started plundering the city. Meanwhile, the Indian Army had already landed at Srinagar Airport that morning and rushed to stop the invaders from advancing further. Brigadier Rajinder Singh’s valiant stand provided Maharaja Hari Singh with four days to conduct negotiations with the Government of India for accession, while Mountbatten imposed restriction after restriction, causing further delays by forcing Pandit Nehru to accept the clause of self-determination before accepting the accession.

Had Pandit Nehru shown statesmanship and magnanimity, the history of the subcontinent might have been different. There is no doubt that Maharaja Hari Singh knew that given the heterogeneous population of his state, with Hindus, Muslims of two denominations, Sikhs, and Buddhists, it was never possible to join Pakistan. India was the only ultimate option. In this regard, it is pertinent to recall that at the Round Table Conference in London, Maharaja Hari Singh advocated for the transfer of power, which had adverse consequences for him as the British did not appreciate his statement. They created disturbances in his state, which he managed to survive. However, he could not survive the leadership upheaval brought about by the transfer of power, which he had advocated for. Maharaja Hari Singh was a benign ruler in many respects, but he was unlucky. He was never comfortable after 1947 until his demise on April 21, 1961, in Bombay, spending virtually fourteen years in exile. It is difficult to say how the history of this subcontinent would have unfolded without the “Kashmir Contention.” Both dominions might have coexisted as good neighbors and progressed as the fastest-growing economy in the world, together as a subcontinent.