RECALLING LATE BRIG RAJINDER SINGH'S MARTYRDOM - 1947
History is often made, written, and unfortunately forgotten over time. However, there are certain events in history that involved bloodshed and supreme sacrifice, which must be preserved and recalled to inspire future generations. Such is the case with the martyrdom of Brig Rajinder Singh, MVC. In this article, we will attempt to recount the significant aspects that led to his martyrdom and honor his extraordinary courage, valor, and self-sacrifice.
During the time when Jammu and Kashmir State, under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh, was deliberating on its accession to the Union of India, Pakistan had different plans. Sensing an unfavorable decision from the Maharaja, Pakistan decided to seize the state by force. They assembled a mixed force consisting of ex-servicemen, serving personnel on leave, tribesmen from NWFP, and regular Pakistani Army soldiers. Exploiting religious sentiments, pro-Pakistani elements within the J&K State forces were also enticed to join this force.
The heightened activity and aggressive movements of armed men in civilian clothes within Pakistan, observed by our own people living close to the border, raised alarm bells. To bring this matter to the attention of the state authorities, a delegation led by S. Sant Singh Teg and S. Harnam Singh Raina from Garhil (Muzaffrabad) visited Srinagar and met with the Maharaja in mid-October.
After assuring them of all possible assistance, the Maharaja advised the delegation to meet the Chief of Staff, Brig Rajinder Singh. During their meeting, the delegation was informed that due to the unavailability of additional troops, as the entire J&K State forces were already deployed along the long and challenging state border, the Army couldn’t provide additional reinforcements. However, the Chief of Staff agreed to issue weapons to locals who were trained to handle them for self-defense.
At that time, I was serving as an instructor at the J&K State Forces Army Training School in Srinagar. I was summoned to Army Headquarters and assigned to accompany the delegation for the distribution of weapons to suitable individuals along the border. The Chief of Staff also instructed me to meet the Commanding Officer of 4 J&K Infantry, which was stationed in the Kohala-Domel area with its battalion headquarters in Domel, and gather his assessment of the situation. I was to report back to the Chief of Staff upon my return to Srinagar.
I completed the distribution of weapons on October 21, 1947, and proceeded to Domel to meet Lt Col N S Samyal, the CO of 4 J&K Infantry. I briefed him about the distribution of weapons and inquired about the situation across the border in his sector. According to him, everything was fine, and he exuded confidence in his men’s ability to handle any untoward developments. While under normal circumstances, his assessment and faith in his battalion would have been sufficient, given the partition of the country and the emergence of a theocratic state, he needed to reassess the situation, particularly considering the presence of pro-Pakistan sympathizers within his battalion.
Upon returning to Srinagar on October 21 or 22, I planned to brief the Chief of Staff the next morning. However, I received a shock when Brig Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff, unexpectedly arrived at my house in the early hours of October 22 in Badami Bagh Cantonment. He inquired about my mission, and I informed him about the distribution of weapons and the favorable report from the CO of 4 J&K Infantry. The Chief of Staff, visibly worried, informed me that the situation had taken a disastrous turn. Colonel Narain Singh, his adjutant Capt Ram Singh, and most of the other officers and men had been killed by pro-Pakistani elements within the battalion. These elements had seized control of all the weapons and equipment at the battalion headquarters, and the situation at other posts was no different.
Leaving my house, the Chief of Staff directed me to report to his office as soon as possible. The situation was grave, as the entire valley and the city of Srinagar stood on the brink of danger with no means to respond effectively. The only source of information was the civilian population, as all communication channels, including wireless and telephone, had been destroyed, and the personnel manning them had either deserted or been killed.
After recovering from the initial shock, the Chief of Staff ordered me and another officer, Capt. Nasib Singh, to proceed to Uri immediately with a detachment of pioneers and explosives. Our mission was to destroy the bridge over the Uri nallah on October 22. Simultaneously, a small force of approximately company strength (75-80 personnel) was assembled from rear parties in Srinagar. This force would be deployed to halt the enemy’s advance at a suitable distance from Srinagar, primarily to buy time for the Maharaja to decide on the issue of accession.
Following the orders, the demolition detachment, including myself and Capt. Nasib Singh, proceeded to Uri. Due to the limited quantity of explosives available, we were only able to partially damage the bridge, allowing vehicular traffic to continue crossing it.
Upon our return to Srinagar, we joined the small force led by Brig Rajinder Singh himself. Another officer, Capt. Prithi Singh, who served as one of the Maharaja’s ADCs, also joined the group. On October 23, the force hastily left Srinagar in four 1.5-ton vehicles, with Brig Rajinder Singh traveling in a 1-ton Power Wagon, and I served as his OP Staff Officer. The force encountered no opposition until Uri, where they heard sporadic gunfire and mortar fire in the distance, causing their progress to slow, as they anticipated enemy contact at any moment.
As the column reached the general area of Garhi, it came under heavy automatic and mortar fire, resulting in casualties among the troops in the leading vehicles. Captain Prithi Singh, who was leading the advance, was seriously wounded. To prevent further casualties and preserve the strength of the force, an immediate withdrawal was ordered. Despite the intense enemy fire, the J&K MT drivers displayed exceptional courage and skill in turning the vehicles around on a narrow stretch of road. The force retreated all the way back to Baramulla, and Captain Prithi Singh, along with the other wounded, was evacuated to Srinagar.
Upon arrival in Baramulla, Brig Rajinder Singh spoke with the Maharaja over SP Baramulla’s telephone and informed him about the situation. After being briefed by the Chief of Staff and possibly consulting with his advisor, the Maharaja sent a personally signed order addressed to Brig Rajinder Singh. The order directed him to proceed to Uri immediately and fight the enemy there until the last man and last round. The message was delivered by Brig Faqir Singh, the Commander of the Kashmir Brigade, in the late evening of October 23, 1947.
In the meantime, one section of mortars (2 Mortar) and one section of MMGs (2MMGs) that had been flown in from Jammu also joined the force in Baramulla. The contingent moved to Uri and occupied a hastily prepared position near the bridge over Uri nallah by first light on October 24. The enemy, advancing along the river Jehlum, soon made contact with the position and launched several attempts to dislodge the defenders with heavy automatic and mortar fire. However, they did not launch a determined attack, and the defenders managed to hold Uri until the night of October 26.
By the evening of October 24, the pattern of enemy tactics indicated that they were avoiding direct engagement and instead sought to encircle the position with their overwhelming numbers. After a brief discussion with his officers, the force commander decided to modify the plan of fighting to the last man and last round at Uri. The new plan involved fighting the enemy from three or four successive positions between Uri and Baramulla. Depending on the operational situation, the force would occupy delaying positions in the general areas of Rampore, Mahura, and Buniyar.
Over the next three days, from October 24 to 26, the enemy made numerous attempts to overpower the force but was consistently repelled by the highly motivated and brave soldiers. The force’s exemplary courage, determination, and do-or-die spirit had a significant impact on the enemy’s fighting potential, preventing them from launching a close combat assault on the positions.
During the fight in the Mahura power house area on October 25, Captain Nasib Singh was seriously wounded by a sniper bullet, and he, along with other seriously wounded soldiers, was evacuated to Srinagar. To prevent the enemy from encircling the position, the force commander ordered a withdrawal to the next position in the Buniyar area on the night of October 25/26.
At Buniyar, the enemy intensified their aggression and came within grenade firing range of the position for the first time. A fierce battle ensued throughout October 26. The enemy’s desperation seemed to have been triggered by the news of the Ruler, supported by the popular leader of the valley, Sher-i-Kashmir Sheikh Mohd Abdullah, signing the Instrument of Accession of the State to the Indian Union. It also indicated the possibility of the Indian Army’s induction into the state. Despite the intense pressure, the enemy failed to overrun the position.
In light of the evolving situation, the Buniyar position became untenable, and a withdrawal to a further position, which had been scouted earlier, was ordered. The withdrawal was planned to commence after midnight, under the cover of moonlight, allowing the vehicles to move without headlights. The convoy consisted of three vehicles carrying troops and one 1-ton Dodge Power Wagon carrying the Chief of Staff. I sat in the co-driver’s seat with the Chief of Staff. However, shortly after setting off, about a mile from the ambush site, the convoy encountered a roadblock hastily organized by the enemy using stones and boulders. The enemy unleashed a heavy volume of automatic and mortar fire as soon as the first vehicle hit the roadblock. Captain Jawala Singh, traveling in the first vehicle, was wounded along with a few other men, but the first two vehicles managed to push through sheer determination on the part of the drivers. Unfortunately, the Chief of Staff’s vehicle became stuck, and the heavy enemy fire destroyed the vehicle, killing the Chief of Staff. Out of the three or four signalmen manning the wireless set in the vehicle, only one NCO survived with an injured leg. I was fortunate to escape with only a minor injury to my right leg.
The wounded NCO and I managed to escape from the ambush site and made our way on foot to Baramulla. Upon reaching Baramulla, I contacted the Brigade-Major, Piara Singh (later a Minister in the State Cabinet), of the Kashmir Brigade in Srinagar and informed him of the situation and the fate of Brig Rajinder Singh and his force. Although the Brigade-Major did not fully comprehend the gravity of the situation, he instructed me to gather the remnants of the force and stall the enemy’s advance towards Srinagar. I explained to him that I was the only man present, accompanied by the wounded NCO, and that we were both injured. I also informed him that Indian Army units were expected to arrive in Srinagar soon. The Brigade-Major then advised me to stay in Baramulla and brief the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh LI. He assured me that an ambulance would be sent to transport me and any other casualties back to Srinagar after briefing the incoming troops’ commander.
In the afternoon of October 27, the Commanding Officer of 1 Sikh LI arrived in Baramulla, and I briefed him on what I knew about the operational situation. However, the Commanding Officer and a couple of other officers accompanying him failed to fully grasp the implications, leading to heavy casualties among the battalion, including the Commanding Officer himself, within a few hours of their arrival.
The wounded NCO and I were transported to Srinagar in the ambulance and taken to the Military Hospital for treatment of our injuries.
The week-long skirmish led by Brig Rajinder Singh was a monumental event, featuring a small force commanded by a senior officer determined to sacrifice his life to save the valley from falling into enemy hands. His actions not only protected the region but also brought glory to the young nation, leaving an everlasting legacy of inspiration for future generations of officers. The principle advocated by the first Indian Chief of Army Staff, Field Marshal C M Carriapa, that “good officers make a good army” was demonstrated in this operation. The success of the operation also provided a solid foundation for subsequent major operations launched by the Indian Army to drive out the invaders from most parts of the state.
During one of my visits to my son, Lt Gen Diljeet Singh, in 2006, when he was the GOC-in-C of the Western Command, I came across the “JAK Rif Coffee Table Book” in the Command House Library. Upon glancing through it, I noticed that the section relating to Brig Rajinder Singh’s martyrdom incorrectly stated that the entire force was killed to the last man. This is a blatant falsehood. Out of the five officers involved in the operation, only Brig Rajinder Singh was martyred, and the other four, including myself, Capt Prithi Singh, Capt Jawala Singh, and Capt Nasib Singh, escaped with injuries and returned to active duty after receiving treatment. Similarly, at least 70% of the troops managed to retreat, albeit with some sustaining serious and disabling injuries.
Those who delve into writing regimental histories, especially regarding operational aspects, should ensure they do not include facts that may later be found to be untrue, as it undermines the credibility of the narrative. Proper research, referencing all available records, and interacting with survivors should be conducted to ensure the accuracy of historical accounts.